The Bulgarian model of the Prosecutor’s Office and the position of the Prosecutor General

The Bulgarian model of the Prosecutor’s Office and the position of the Prosecutor General

The text is the work of three Bulgarian scientists Venelin Terziev, Marin Georgiev and Stefcho Bankov and was presented in the form of a report on the role and place of the prosecution in Bulgaria during a scientific conference in early September in the Hungarian capital Budapest. The document is published in specialized scientific sites in English and Russian.


Тhe protests in Bulgaria are interesting phenomena and in principle they should be aimed at demands and intensions for something better, something different and tending to achieve a development of the public relations in a specific direction. Our recent and more distant history abounds of facts and circumstances presenting multiple examples for the consciences of such activities or inactions. We often search and find the guiltiness within the others and nor in ourselves at all. It is a common characteristic of Bulgarians that they are used to make evaluation and qualifications without any competences for that, neither any experience in the specific subject of matter.

We are witnessing of a similar phenomenon in the last months – the idea of protesting or expressing our personal opinion, which is really positive, itself for a democratic and developed society, what we are pretending to be. The tensions, the wishes and strivings following our daily routine are surely affecting all parts of our prosaic and daily life. It is basic and fundamental for each of us to strive a better way of life and to be part of the community, which is at maximum fair to ourselves and others. The feeling of satisfaction and equality are basic principles that are of great importance for the human-being and if some actions are satisfying myself, for the people around me it could be to some extend or at all unsatisfactory.

The achievement of appropriate and right decisions in the context of a crisis situation is a really difficult mission, which is experiencing the need of high quality expertise and a good reaction in such circumstances. 

We are in the middle of such crisis situation at the moment. Without trying to make a defined analysis about the reasons predispose it, it is obvious that the situation is happening and that it is happening in a way that provokes discomfort for its participants.

An interesting point is the environment, moreover the circumstances around the Bulgarian Prosecutor’s Office; at least because of the requirements for the Prosecutor’s Office which are too high, or even out of the competences of the institution. Unfortunately, the society is critical enough and is directing task, expectations and is striving for responsibilities, which are legally not of the competence of the institution. Moreover, this makes the Prosecutor’s Office to search other possibilities for answering these expectations, without violating the rule of law. In case, when this opportunity is namely the providing more and reliable information, some of us are reacting as its role is as a political speaker or media spectrum. In opposite, if there is a lack of such information – it looks like that the institutions are not well working and inactive.

Undoubtedly, the persons themselves are defining also part of the look of the specified body or organization and that is more than logical. If we like that or not is a question of personal acceptance and self-feeling but surely it is a characteristic of the individual behavior.

Paradoxically in this specific situation is that namely the protesters for human rights and freedom are using such methods and tools violating the fundamental human rights.  

When we are “searching” and “striving” a just society, the rules must be basic for the formation of this society and its public development, whose destruction is not of interest of nobody. Without any evaluations and characteristics of specific personal positions it is needed to be mentioned that the protection of the rules – legal, moral and generally speaking those, which are guarantee for the normal flow of the social processes, it is obligatory and to the extend satisfying the expectations of the participants in this process. 

The features of this change of that social process are common and well-known to economists, jurists, sociologist and analyzers – namely the use of enough free media scene for presenting information not corresponding to the actual facts and events. Undoubtedly, within this crisis situation the discrediting individuals is easy and quick approach.

And without knowing in personal the Prosecutor General of the Republic of Bulgaria it could be given as a good example for the fact that we are aware of so much personal information about his private life, bank accounts and even about his educational development. Some of you will say that this action is absolute rightful in accordance with the social status of the person working for the benefit of the society. Partially, those of you will be right only with regards to the fact that to be informed is an important right but not in relation to the opportunity for misinterpretations, explanations and malicious hints (even if we are not searching it, it is all over the internet). And without being defenders it should be noted that academic experience and the academic PHD honor is a process and good opportunity for upgrading personal competences. If this is the decision of an individual, even when he is a prosecutor general of the Republic of Bulgaria, it should be admired. Just to remind you that with this regard there are accredited universities, Law of development of human resources, Regulations and other documentation, regulating this process and in case we are not supporting this or we have any counterclaims to this process, we should change the regulation itself or should impose some criteria.

Backwards to the procedure, which we wants so much to be followed. We cannot be a judge of whether an individual is successfully or not coping with his or her official duties but if we would like at least to go further in our social development, so the following of rules is the base of it. When we strive for resignations and when we are reaching out personal fairness, we should be led by the rules. The opinion of the protesters could not be evaluated as objective but it is real and possible. And when it exists, it should be answered convincing us in the trueness that we are doing it in favor of the country.

And when the powers of this prosecutor general seem to us very much or his actions not fair enough, we must again follow the rules to change or put in such a way that they are clear enough, accurate and under public control. Otherwise, everything else speaks of processes of frantic desires that we want to happen outside the rules, and we will let the rules apply after that.

Comparative legal research of the functions, nomination procedures and profiles of the prosecutors general in the Member States of the European Union

One comparative legal research of the functions, procedures for nomination and the profiles of the prosecutors general in the Member states, observing the timeframe from November 2018 - January 2019 and team of: Dr. Ivanka Ivanova (project manager, author), Georgi Angelov (expert, data collector) and Dr. Yani Kirov (expert, data collector) and is funded by the project “What do we (not) know about the prosecutors general in the EU Member States?”. The Ministry of the Foreign Affair of Netherland gives some interesting interpretations about specifications of the Bulgarian model.  This research is, of course, trying analytical and comparative analysis but could not be accepted as a complex because of multiple reasons.

In the Bulgarian Constitution of 1991, the issues of the status and organization of the Prosecution are settled together with those of the court in chapter "Judiciary", but the Prosecution as a structure has retained the two main characteristics it had in the totalitarian state: individual prosecutors do not return to the composition of the courts (as it was until 1947), and remain in an independent structure parallel to that of the courts. While the Prosecution in most EU Member States is a body specialized exclusively in the field of criminal law, the Bulgarian Prosecutor's Office retains the function of general supervision of legality (Article 127, items 5 and 6 of the Constitution).

The appointments, career development and discipline of judges, prosecutors and investigators are regulated in the Constitution and the law in an identical way i.e. prosecutors and investigators have the statute of irremovability as that for judges and the same guarantees of independence as them. The personnel matters of the three magistrates' professions are decided by a separate collective body - the Supreme Judicial Council, which until 2015 functioned as one collegе body, and then two separate colleges were formed: Judicial College, which is responsible for appointments, discipline and career development of judges, and the Prosecutorial College - which resolves the same issues for prosecutors and investigators.

In the other Member States of the European Union, the appointment and career development of prosecutors are usually regulated differently from those of judges, and appointments, especially of prosecutors, in the majority of Member States are made by a single body (Minister of Justice or Head of State).

In Bulgaria the case is special because, on the one hand, the Prosecutorial College of the Supreme Judicial Council as a collective body appoints prosecutors, the Plenum of the Supreme Judicial Council as a collective body elects a candidate for prosecutor general, and then it reports on the organization's activities to a collective body the National Assembly and may be removed by the President only on the initiative of collective bodies the Supreme Judicial Council or the National Assembly.

However, the collective bodies themselves do not bear any responsibility for their decisions, and by definition they act more slowly and with difficulty than the individual ones. Conversely, entrusting the procedure for appointing prosecutors and appointing or dismissing the Attorney General to sole bodies, which is the most common model in the other Member States of the European Union, serves as a guarantee for the efficiency and accountability of the Prosecution itself.

There is no much about the role of the prosecutor general in the Bulgarian constitution: like the presidents of the Supreme Court of Cassation and the Supreme Administrative Court, the prosecutor general is appointed by the president on proposal of the Supreme Judicial Council; with a 7-year term and is not subject to re-election according to Article 126, para. 2 of the Constitution, his main function is to supervise the legality and methodological guidance of the activities of all prosecutors.

The Bulgarian Prosecutor General is accountable to the National Assembly for the activity related to criminal investigation and prosecution. On a proposal of a quarter of MPs, the Parliament can initiate a removal procedure for the Prosecutor General, for which a decision is required by a qualified majority of 2/3. The matter of the removal of the chairmen of the two supreme courts is settled in the same way.

The Bulgarian legislature has provided guarantees for the independence of the prosecutor peneral from political power, which are the same as those of the chairmen of the two supreme courts. The Bulgarian Prosecutor General is by right a member of the Supreme Judicial Council and after 2015 he is by right Chairman of the Prosecutorial College of the Supreme Judicial Council. Five of the members of the Prosecutorial College of the Supreme Judicial Council are subordinate to the Prosecutor General, which gives him great power in resolving issues related to the appointment and career development of prosecutors.

In addition to the Prosecution, the Bulgarian Prosecutor General also heads the National Investigation Service and may delegate investigations to it at his own discretion. All specialized units of the Prosecutor's Office are subordinate to the Prosecutor General and, at his discretion, may set up special teams to investigate certain crimes. He may amend or revoke the acts of all prosecutors in the country; he may also, on his own decision, second prosecutors. "

In summary of this comparative analysis and based on the actual situation, it can be argued that a sufficiently objective mechanism for selection and control in Bulgaria has been created to meet the respective needs. Whether this mechanism works effectively and transparently is a matter for another type of analysis and assessment. Nevertheless, Bulgaria is not particularly different from the accepted European practice, and this is an objective right with its functional significance of the Bulgarian legislator.

The case of Kolevi v. Bulgaria, on appeal №1108 / 2002 in the European Court of Human Rights

An interesting example in this direction is the case of Kolevi v. Bulgaria, on appeal №1108 / 2002, fifth Chamber, chaired by Peer Lorenzen at the European Court of Human Rights.

The specific factual circumstances are as follows: The case is on an appeal (№ 1108/02) against the Republic of Bulgaria, filed in the Court on 17 December 2001 on the grounds of Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the "Convention") by Nikolay Georgiev Kolev, a Bulgarian citizen born in 1949. Mr Kolev was shot dead on 28 December 2002.

His wife, Ms Nanka Koleva, his daughter, Ms Hristina Koleva, and his son, Mr Georgi Kolev, stated that they intended to continue the proceedings on the complaint, as well to submit additional complaints. “The applicants alleged, in particular, that Mr Kolev's detention in 2001 had been unlawful and unjustified, that his complaints against his detention had not been considered in due time, and the investigation of the first applicant's murder had not been independent and effective.

By decision of 4 December 2007, the Court declared the appeal partly admissible and in part inadmissible.

The applicable domestic law is as follows:

Detention without a judicial warrant

1. Article 202, para. 1 and Article 203 of the Penal Procedure Code of 1974 ("PPC 1974"), which was in force at the time, provide that a suspect may be detained without charge for up to 72 hours with a prosecutor's decision.

2. Article 152a of the 1974 PPC provides that a person who has been formally charged with a criminal offense may be detained temporarily for a period of up to 72 hours by a prosecutor's decision. Within this period, the accused must be brought before a court.

3. There is no data on the existence of internal court practice on the issue of whether the 72-hour terms for detention under Article 202 and Article 152a may or may not be sequential.

Moving complaints against detention on remand 

4. According to Article 152b of the 1974 PPC, in force at the time, appeals against detention must be lodged with the relevant investigator or prosecutor, who has the obligation to send them "immediately" to the competent court. The court must hold a hearing on the case within three days of receiving the appeal.

Prosecutorial immunity and procedure for bringing criminal charges against prosecutors

5. All judicial officials, including prosecutors, enjoyed immunity against prosecution until September 2003.  According to Article 132 of the Constitution, in force until September 2003, in connection with Article 70, criminal proceedings against prosecutors may be initiated only if their immunity is removed by a decision of the Supreme Judicial Council. The Judiciary Act of 1994 (section 27 (1) (6) and section 134 (3) states that the power to make proposals to the Supreme Judicial Council to remove the immunity of a judicial official is conceded to the Prosecutor General.

6. As the immunity can only be lifted upon a proposal of the Prosecutor General, which means that it is not possible to lift the immunity of the Prosecutor General against his will, in 1998 the National Assembly amended the Judiciary System Act of 1994 and empowered the Chairmen of the Supreme Court of Cassation and of the Supreme Administrative Court as well the Minister of Justice to submit a proposal to the Supreme Judicial Council for waiving the immunity of each judicial official. On 14 January 1999 the Constitutional Court declared the amendment unconstitutional, concluding that it violated Article 127, paragraph 1 of the Constitution, which gives the Prosecution authorities the exclusive power to bring charges and lead the prosecution against criminal suspects (decision № 1, constitutional case № 34/1998).

7. In June 2002, the National Assembly adopted a new amendment aimed at eliminating the shortcomings in the law. During the debate on the amendment, several MPs considered it unconstitutional, given the decision of the Constitutional Court in 1999, and expressed the opinion that the shortcoming is derived from the text of the Constitution and can be eliminated only after an amendment to the Constitution. However, Parliament adopted a text according to which one-fifth of the members of the Supreme Judicial Council could propose to the entire Council the waiver of the immunity of any judicial official.

8. On 16 December 2002, the Constitutional Court rejected the amendment (decision №1, constitutional case № 17/2002), citing the reasons set out in its ruling dated 1999. The Constitutional Court did not give an opinion on the question whether the ensuing impossibility to waive the immunity of the Prosecutor General is compatible with the constitutional principle of legality, as well as with the fundamental rights protected by the Constitution.

9. The shortcoming was eliminated as of September 30, 2003, after the National Assembly amended the Constitution and introduced, by virtue of Article 132, para. 4, the possibility for one fifth of the members of the Supreme Judicial Council to refer to the entire Council, which has the right to make a decision for bringing charges and detention of each judicial official. In addition, with the amendment, Article 132 of the Constitution no longer uses the term "immunity" and limits the number of cases in which permission from the Supreme Judicial Council is required. According to the amended text, such prior authorization is only necessary for bringing charges against judges and prosecutors when the charges are for crimes committed by them in the performance of their official duties.

Obtaining such permission is also necessary for the issuing of detention orders for judges and prosecutors, regardless of the nature of the charges in respect of which detention is sought. The Judiciary System Act was amended as of April 9, 2004 to reflect the new constitutional provisions.

10. Following the above amendments, in theory, any prosecutor or investigator could bring charges against the Prosecutor General without the need for prior authorization in the case of a crime not related to the latter's official duties.

However, the Prosecutor General could overturn any such decision taken by a subordinate prosecutor or investigator. Also, the permission of the Supreme Judicial Council to detain the Prosecutor General remains necessary.

11. A further amendment to the Constitution of February 2007 removed all procedural restrictions on the prosecution of judicial officials. The new Judiciary System Act of 2007 reflects this change in its provisions. Since February 2007, in theory, any prosecutor or investigator has the right, without prior authorization, to bring charges against the Prosecutor General, or to request a pre-trial detention order from the relevant court when there is sufficient information that he may have committed a crime. As mentioned above, however, the Prosecutor General may overturn any such decision taken by a subordinate prosecutor or investigator.

12. According to the 1991 Constitution, all prosecutors have the status of judicial officers (magistrates), and are thus part of the judiciary. After three years of service, they receive a mandate. The appointment and dismissal of judicial officers is possible only by a decision of the Supreme Judicial Council (see paragraphs 136 and 137 below). The Prosecutor General, who is also a judicial officer, is appointed by the President of the Republic of Bulgaria on the proposal of the Supreme Judicial Council for a single seven-year term. Prior to the expiry of his term of office, the same grounds for removal apply to him as to all other judicial officers. He may be removed by the President of the Republic of Bulgaria on the proposal of the Supreme Judicial Council.

13. According to Article 129 of the 1991 Constitution, in force as of 30 September 2003, judicial officers with a mandate, including prosecutors, may be dismissed only by retirement, in cases of permanent physical incapacity, or when they are sentenced to imprisonment after the final entry into force of a sentence on charges of intentional commission of a crime.

14. Since 30 September 2003, when the Constitution was amended, removal is possible in case of "serious breach or systematic failure to perform the duties of a judicial officer" and in cases of "acts detrimental to the reputation of the judiciary". In 2006, the National Assembly adopted an amendment to the Constitution, according to which not only the Supreme Judicial Council but also two-thirds of parliament members can propose to the President to remove the Prosecutor General or the Presidents of the two Supreme Courts for the reasons mentioned above.

On 13 September 2006, the Constitutional Court annulled the amendment, ruling that it aimed to change the balance between the various authorities, and that the Constitution required such changes to be made by the Grand National Assembly. Several judges differ and believe that the change is necessary because the current legal regime does not offer sufficient guarantees against illegal actions committed by senior prosecutors or judges.

In his dissenting opinion, one of the judges noted the following:
"Given the fact that the Supreme Judicial Council includes members who are subordinate to [the Prosecutor General and the Presidents of the two Supreme Courts] or are in friendly relations with them, it is very likely that the Supreme Judicial Council will not be able to form a majority in support of the dismissal of these three high-ranking judicial officials despite the violations of the law committed by them.

Prior to the [rejected constitutional amendment], the domestic legal order was helpless in such situations and the illegal conduct of judicial staff had to be endured for long periods.

Tolerating lack of control and accountability is contrary to the spirit of the Constitution. [Unfortunately], as a result of [the majority decision in the present case], control over the activities of senior judicial officials will continue to be ineffective, as it is exercised by themselves and their subordinates".

15. Under the Judiciary Act 1994 (section 40) and the Judicial Systems Act 2007 (section 230), the Supreme Judicial Council has the right to remove from office any judicial officer against whom criminal charges have been brought.

Powers of the Prosecutor General

16. The system of the Prosecutor's Office in the Republic of Bulgaria is centralized. All prosecutors are subordinate and accountable to the Prosecutor General (section 112 of the Judicial Systems Act 1994 in force until 2007, and section 136 of the Judiciary Act 2007).

17. The Prosecutor General, as the highest-ranked prosecutor in the hierarchy, has the right to issue mandatory orders concerning the work of each prosecutor, including the work in specific cases, or to take over the work in a case in which another prosecutor works (section 116 of the Judicial Systems Act 1994, in force until 2007, and sections 139 and 143 of the Judicial Systems Act 2007).

18. The Prosecutor General has the right to submit to the Supreme Judicial Council proposals for the promotion, dismissal or disciplinary sanction of prosecutors (paragraphs 27, 30 and 172 of the Judicial Systems Act 1994, in force until 2007, and paragraph 38 and 312 of the Judicial Systems Act 2007).

19. Under the 1974 PPC, in force until 2006, the prosecutor controlled the investigation (Article 48 § 3 of the 1974 PPC). This includes the right to give specific instructions, to change the investigator, or to take over the entire investigation (Article 176, paragraph 1 of the same Code). The 2006 PPC strengthens prosecutorial control and his direct involvement in the investigation of crimes. Furthermore, as a result of constitutional and legislative changes of 2006, 2007 and 2009, the investigative services were integrated into the prosecution offices, and for the moment they are administratively subordinate to the Prosecutor General (Articles 127 and 128 of the Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria and Articles 136, 148 - 153 of the Judicial Systems Act  of 2007). In 2009, the Constitutional Court rejected a proposal to declare as unconstitutional the amendments to the Judiciary Act 2009 that regulate this subordination.

The Supreme Judicial Council

20. The Supreme Judicial Council has 25 members. The Chairmen of the Supreme Court of Cassation and the Supreme Administrative Court and the Prosecutor General are ex officio members. Parliament elects eleven members, who may be judges, prosecutors, investigators and lawyers. The remaining eleven members are elected at separate meetings by delegates of judges (elect six members), prosecutors (elect four members) and investigators (elect one member) (Article 130 of the Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria, paragraphs 17-20 of the Judicial Systems Act  from 1994, in force until 2007, and paragraphs 17 and 20-26 of the Judicial Systems Act  of 2007).

21. Decisions concerning, inter alia, to the dismissal of a judicial officer or a proposal to the President of Bulgaria of removal the Prosecutor General shall be taken by the members of the Supreme Judicial Council by secret ballot.
Until September 2003, when Article 131 of the Constitution was changed, this was not the case, as regards the decisions to waive the immunity of judicial officers of the prosecution office, which were taken by a procedure of open voting. Between September 2003 and February 2007, these decisions also had to be taken by secret ballot. Since February 2007, the permission of the Supreme Judicial Council has no longer been required to bring charges of any kind against a judicial officer (see § 127 above).

The decision in these proceedings is as follows:

1. Assume that the widow and children of the first applicant are in a position to continue the proceedings instead of him;

2. Accepts that a violation of the right of the first applicant has been committed according to Article 5, paragraph 3 of the Convention to be brought promptly before a judge or other official authorized by law to perform judicial functions;

3. Assume that the first applicant's deprivation of liberty between 13 September and 29 November 2001 was unlawful and contradict to Article 5, paragraph 1 of the Convention;

4. Accepts that it is not necessary to consider separately the complaint under Article 5, paragraph 3 of the Convention, in the sense that the first applicant's deprivation of liberty was unjustified and had lasted too long;

5. Assume that there has been a violation of the first applicant's right under Article 5, paragraph 4 of the Convention that the complaint against detention to be dealt with promptly;

6. Accepts that a violation of Article 2 of the Convention, consisting in the fact that the investigation into the murder of Mr Kolev had been ineffective and the necessary independence was lacking;

7. Accepts that the respondent State must pay the relevant taxes, such as non-pecuniary damage, as well as the costs and expenses;

8. Dismisses the remainder of the applicants' claim for righteous satisfaction.


The independence of the Prosecutor General of any Member State of the European Union is extremely important with a view to comply with the legal framework and the rule of law. It lays the foundations of trust in the judiciary and the fundaments of statehood, creates a sense of law and legal order. That is why it is highly important in the context of the present to outline the control of the activity of the Prosecutor General in the exercise of his powers, clearly emphasizing that the Bulgarian Prosecutor General is not out of control in his powers.

The legal powers of the Prosecutor General of the Republic of Bulgaria are even more limited than the powers of analogous figures in the legal systems of other EU countries. The Prosecutor General exercises his powers only in exceptional cases and according to previously prescribed legal procedures.

The Prosecutor General of the Republic of Bulgaria provides methodological guidance on the activities of all prosecutors and investigators (Article 136, para. 5 of Judicial Systems Act[1], analogy Article 46, para. 5 of Criminal Procedure Code) for accurate and equally application of the laws and protection of the legal rights and interests of the citizens, legal entities and the state, through the issuance of common methodological instructions and directions regarding the activity of the Prosecution (power under Art. 138, para. 1, item 6 of Law on the Judiciary). The acts cited in support of the allegation are general. It should be noted that they relate generally to the activities of all prosecutors and investigators, have the character of recommendations that create organizational prerequisites and contain methodological guidelines for the proper application of the law. Due to these general methodological guidelines, containing directions for the same type of cases used (most often in case of legislative changes), there is the possibility of applying the norm by all prosecutors equally and fairly.

It is clear that the methodological guidelines and directions, as general and principled, aim to promote professional development and at the same time to support the separate and independent exercise of the prosecutorial activity. The claims of various subjects that they are specific are not only untenable, but lead to the conclusion of ignorance of the regulations. All instructions do not concern a separate and specific case. It is for this reason that the recommendation of the experts, who performed an independent analysis of the structural and functional model of the Bulgarian Prosecutor's Office, is that they be publicly available, as long as this does not conflict with the effectiveness of the investigation in relation to prosecution and national security.[2]

The trend over the last year and a half, which has been undertaken by the Prosecutor General of the Republic of Bulgaria to publish more such acts, leading to a fuller transparency of cases in which the Prosecutor General himself has exercised his powers of methodological guidance, implements the recommendation and is a sign to the Bulgarian society for a clearly expressed will and firm position on transparency and control of the activity of the Prosecution, insofar as this does not pose a threat to national security and/or would vitiate an investigation in various cases.

The actions of the Prosecutor General of the Republic of Bulgaria are also related to the exercise of legally regulated powers and control of lawfulness in specific cases, as expressly provided by law (for example Article 243, paragraph 10 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the requests for reopening of criminal cases under Chapter Thirty-three of the Criminal Procedure Code, etc.).

Generally speaking, if the Prosecutor General commits a crime, he cannot remain "anonymous."

It is considered that proclaiming the untruth about the untouchability of the Prosecutor General in a state governed by the rule of law, it is also worrying that in practice this puts unacceptable pressure on the Prosecution, which will not be exaggerated if it is qualified as motivational violence vis compulsive - especially against the Prosecutor General himself.

As the current Prosecutor General is the first Prosecutor General from practice, he is aware of the need for legislative changes and interpretative decisions that ensure a unified standard in the resolution of cases. It is necessary to unify the practice between the Prosecution and the Court, in order to ensure effective criminal proceedings and fair sentences.

[1] In 2016 (issue 62/2016, in force from 09.08.2016) Article 136 of the Judicial Systems Act  was amended, according to whose new wording (corresponding to Article 126 of the Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria) the Prosecution is united body and its structure corresponds to that of the courts'. With the change of this norm the centralization in the system of the Prosecutor's office ended. This idea has been realized not only through an editorial change (dropping the word "centralized"), but also finds expression in the provisions of Article 136, para. 3 of the Law on the Judiciary,  which stipulates that prosecutors and investigators are guided by the administrative heads of the respective Prosecutor's office and of Article 136, paragraph 5 of the Law on the Judiciary (former paragraph 6), which provides that the Prosecutor General supervises the legality and methodological guidance of the activities of all prosecutors and investigators for accurate and equal application of laws and protection of legal rights and interests of citizens, legal entities and the state. I.e. the administrative guidance in the prosecution system is clearly limited horizontally by the methodological guidance vertically. 

[2] See page 9 of the Independent Analysis of the Structural and Functional Model of the Prosecutor's Office of the Republic of Bulgaria and its Independence since December 2016.

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